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Abstract 
This article explains the emergence and institutionalization of the US’s targeted killing practices as a 
case of norm transformation. I argue that international and domestic US prohibitions on assassination 
have not disappeared, but have changed as a result of practitioner-led changes in the conventions, 
technologies, and bureaucratic structures governing the use of force in counterterrorism activities. After 
discussing the limits of alternative explanations, and drawing inspiration from practice theory and 
pragmatist sociology, I posit three causal mechanisms as responsible for the transformation: convention 
reorientation, which was the redefinition of targeted killing to distinguish it from assassination; 
technological revision, which was the development and use of unmanned aerial vehicles (“drones”) to 
bypass normative and strategic concerns over precision; and network synthesis, which was the support 
of the Bush administration and especially of the Obama administration, overruling dissenters from 
within the Central Intelligence Agency (who were often very highly placed). I trace the processes by 
which these mechanisms operated and interacted in simultaneous and mutually reinforcing ways from 
the start of the millennium until now. Finally, I discuss some of the ways in which this contributes to 
institutional analysis and the study of norm change more generally, and, in particular, how it considers 
the role of technology and the reciprocity of means and ends. 
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Introduction 
The institutionalization of targeted killing in the US suggests a significant 
transformation in its interpretation of, and adherence to, norms of war-fighting and 
security-seeking. For two decades, the US has used unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) 
— “drones” — as platforms for small-scale airstrikes on specific individuals, 
increasingly relying upon this method of counterterrorism and counter-insurgency, 
with numbers of strikes and casualties now in the thousands. The evolution of targeted 
killing in the US is already the subject of a number of recent examinations (see, among 
others, Carvin, 2015; Fuller, 2017; Grayson, 2012, 2016; Zenko, 2013), and these 
establish key ways in which changing legal discourse and re-conceptualizations of the 
geography of counterterrorism were facilitating factors.1 This concerns the particular 
definition of assassination under international law (Beres, 1991; Thomas, 2001), 
questions of imminence and pre-emption (Gordon, 2006; Kasher and Yadlin, 2005), 
the space in which a formal armed conflict is occurring, and the status of combatants 
(Blum and Heymann, 2010). Mostly unexamined, however, is a normative dimension 
linking all of these, distinct from — though certainly entangled with — formal or legal 
rules, and extending throughout the practices and institutions composing the US’s 
counterterrorism apparatus.2 
Significant actors involved in that apparatus articulated concerns over what 
was right or proper, making reference not just to laws, but to embedded institutional 
norms, organizational history, and experience with scandal, professionalism, and 
other dynamics warranting focused sociological investigation. In particular, their 
concerns pertain to the salience and nature of international and domestic prohibitions 
on assassination as interpreted by ranking figures in the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) and in the Bush and Obama administrations. This establishes prima facie the 
value of examining this case through an approach oriented around the origins and 
effects of norms and normativity. If so, the case may be a puzzle of norm “death” or 
“disappearance” — a subject that has garnered recent attention from International 
Relations (IR) scholars (D’Ambruoso, 2015; McKeown, 2009; Panke and Petersohn, 
2011). Did prior “norms” cease to guide or regulate practice? 
I address two parts of this puzzle. First, I show that in the US’s 
counterterrorism apparatus, targeted killings do represent a normative change. 
However, this is not the demise of a single norm against assassination, but a 
  
transformation of its contents and referents, reaching across a range of interacting 
formal and informal structures and standards. It indicates not a sweeping change of 
norms at an international level, but rather the ways in which one major power has 
arranged its military and security practices. Second, I explain how that change came 
about, identifying three interacting causal mechanisms as the drivers of a process of 
institutional evolution, in which new normative and strategic logics became embedded 
in new bureaucratic structures, most notably, in the CIA. This again diverges from 
existing scholarship on this subject not only by focusing on normative factors, but also 
by employing a more formal approach to distinguishing causal mechanisms by type 
and by placing them within a process-tracing framework. 
In the first section of the article, I lay out the empirical puzzle, offering a brief 
history of the US’s use of targeted killing. I state three possible explanations: the 
prohibition on assassination has either eroded or disappeared (“norm death”), never 
meaningfully existed in the first place for the actors in question (“norm dissociation”), 
or still exists but has changed in form (“norm transformation”). I draw on public 
documents and testimonies on the case to show that the first two explanations are not 
consistent with key facts of the case. The correct explanation is norm transformation. 
In the second section, I propose that three interacting causal mechanisms 
explain how norm transformation actually occurred: convention reorientation, 
technological revision, and network synthesis. These mechanisms rest on a pragmatist 
view of social action and change: actors, in confronting problematic situations, revise 
their existing habits, practices, and repertoires to synthesize new ways of navigating 
the world, transforming their sense of their environment and their position. Here, 
pragmatism, epistemologically and ontologically, is a theory of situated human 
creativity, placing the potential for transformation in the transactional relations 
knitting together actors and environments (Dewey and Bentley, 1949; Gross, 2009; 
see also Pratt, 2016).3 After outlining how the mechanisms work, I trace them within 
a theoretically informed chronology of the case, using a range of government, media, 
and interview sources to pinpoint practices, technologies, and bureaucratic mutations 
behind the targeted killing program. 
Methodologically, this is a form of process tracing, inflected with insights 
from practice theory. It provides a single case analysis of the over-time operation and 
interaction of the three posited mechanisms, showing how normative obstacles to 
targeted killing were overcome through a mixture of technological, discursive, and 
  
bureaucratic-political maneuvers.4 I define a causal mechanism as a specifiable 
arrangement of unfolding actions — what Guzzini (2011: 336) has called an “action-
complex” — that will produce an observed outcome when triggered. Focusing on 
practitioners as drivers of institutional change, my approach takes cues from practice 
theory but is more focused in its account, serving not to map the structure and history 
of a field, but to pinpoint bundles of actions as they proceed and evolve over time. 
While technology, rhetorical contestation, and bureaucratic politics already feature in 
scholarship on norm change, they drove transformation in this case in simultaneous 
and mutually reinforcing ways — a causal interaction not currently well studied or 
theorized in the field. The outcome is that a prohibition on assassination still persists 
but in changed form. 
In the third section, I discuss how my approach fits into existing research 
programs in the field. I point to a productive, growing conversation between scholars 
of norms and those associated with recent “turns” toward practices and relational 
sociology to theorize institutional change. Contra accounts that view these turns as 
theoretically supplanting norms research (McCourt, 2016), practice and relational 
theorizing fits well within current trends in norms research, and provides theoretical 
goods that scholars of norms already seek. They are helpful for theorizing the role of 
technology, and of the reciprocity of means and ends — of morality and strategy — 
in shaping prevailing norms and practices. I then conclude the article with brief 
remarks on the “portability” of the three mechanisms and their relationship to other 
high-profile cases of transformation of the US’s security apparatus. 
 
Norms and targeted killing 
Beginning in late 2002, under the Bush administration, the CIA began strikes on a 
small number of “high-value targets” comprising al-Qa’ida and Taliban leaders (Plaw, 
2006). Under the Obama administration, these strikes increased in frequency, reaching 
a peak of at least 128 in Pakistan alone in 2010, then declining as US involvement in 
Afghanistan diminished and the focus of the War on Terror shifted to Yemen and the 
Horn of Africa.5 These killings also became more expansive in terms of who was 
targeted and who carried them out. The US military began a parallel targeting program 
while, at one point, the CIA briefly considered using private contractors to carry out 
some killings (Mazzetti, 2013). There is no indication that these kinds of actions will 
  
cease in the future, even if they may scale with strategic needs proportional to larger 
US military commitments abroad. 
Prominent commentators, both academic and public, claim that these “targeted 
killings” constitute assassinations, and indicate the erosion or change of international 
and domestic norms prohibiting assassination. Among scholars, these range from 
historical examinations of state practices (Thomas, 2000) to detailed legal analyses of 
US policy (Banks and Raven-Hansen, 2003). Journalists have made similar claims 
(Meyer, 2009; Scahill, 2013), while some experts have editorialized on the supposedly 
dishonorable connotations of targeted killing (Kilcullen and Exum, 2009). Others 
have disagreed, denying that targeted killing fits legal definitions of assassination 
(Kretzmer, 2005), or questioning whether assassination, in an ordinary sense, is 
prohibited in the first place (Fuller, 2017; Pratt, 2015). 
This debate thus offers three possible explanations of what has taken place, 
each with distinct evidentiary implications. “Norm death” holds that the prohibition 
has disappeared, either because the historical circumstances that established and 
reinforced it no longer obtain, or because it has been eroded by the deliberate efforts 
of pro-assassination “norm entrepreneurs.” Norm death proceeds through escalating 
non-compliance, driven by inadequate incentives to self-regulate (Morrow, 2014) or 
strategic benefits to transgression (Evers, 2017), psychological pressures to reinterpret 
norms until they no longer regulate in any meaningful sense (Shannon, 2000), and the 
presence of alternative new norms that can inspire moral defection (Finnemore and 
Sikkink, 1998). The end result is that a norm that did regulate, constitute, or otherwise 
dispose actors in significant ways ceases to exist. If this is true here, then the evidence 
should show that targeted killing was initially considered by US officials to be 
prohibited under the assassination ban but with the rise of a new counterterrorism 
regime, those officials saw assassination itself as increasingly justifiable. Crucially, 
the evidence would show that the link between targeted killing and assassination 
remained but ceased to present a normative problem for those involved. 
“Norm dissociation” holds that a prohibition on assassination either did not 
actually exist, except perhaps as an unenforced formality, or (more plausibly) that US 
officials did not care whether or not they violated it from the start. Dissociation (as I 
term it) is another form of non-compliance.6 It is a product of organizational culture 
oriented toward violations (Legro, 1997), the absence of specific domestic resonance 
for a particular norm (Cortell and Davis, 1996), or ineffective norm “localization” 
  
(Acharya, 2004), such that a norm nominally exists but is weakly institutionalized in 
practice. The end result is that a norm may exist in name or in law but without 
extension. If this is true here, then the evidence should show that discussions of 
targeted killing within the US policy and security apparatus either never made 
reference to a prohibition on assassination or were oblique or summarily ignored. On 
this view, simple violation of the prohibition is an instance of norm dissociation — a 
methodological assumption is that actors consistently believe in the normative 
correctness of their actions even if they are aware that their interpretations and 
justifications may deviate from those typically accepted by a broader community. If 
those responsible for the US’s targeted killing apparatus knew about, but simply chose 
to ignore, norms prohibiting it, then this would attest to their dissociation from that 
norm — it simply was not something embedded into their institutions or practices. 
The history of the US’s targeted killing program would show that everyone important 
involved in its establishment did not know or did not care if they were breaking 
assassination norms. 
Finally, “norm transformation” holds that a prohibition on assassination did 
exist in ways that mattered for US officials but changed such that targeted killing 
ceased to be assassination in their perspective. This emerges out of a change in how 
rather than whether to comply — one that may be driven by discursive contestation 
(Kornprobst, 2007; Wiener, 2008) but also by technological or bureaucratic 
imperatives, as I show in this article. If this is true here, then the evidence should show 
that debates over targeted killing initially considered the question of whether or not it 
would constitute assassination. Crucially, the evidence should then show that as 
targeted killing became a significant part of US counterterrorism efforts, proponents 
of it engaged in successful and ongoing attempts to differentiate it from assassination, 
outmaneuvering or out-arguing opposition based on assassination prohibitions (see 
Table 1). 
Table 1. 
Competing explanations for the US’s use of targeted killing. 
Explanation Observable implications 
Norm death Key actors considered targeted killing to be assassination, 
initially found this a good reason not to engage in it, but 
  
over time stopped caring whether or not assassination was 
prohibited. 
Norm dissociation Key actors considered targeted killing to be assassination 
but never cared in the first place whether or not 
assassination was prohibited. 
Norm transformation Key actors considered targeted killing to be assassination 
at first but then their definition of assassination changed to 
no longer include it. Assassination, however, remains 
prohibited. 
This final explanation, I argue, is the correct one. According to available 
accounts, the possibility of using drones to carry out targeted killings was first raised 
by Cofer Black, the director of the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center (CTC), in mid-
2000. However, Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) George Tenet was opposed, 
and he was joined in his opposition by other high-ranking members of the CIA. This 
shows an institutional normative divide over what the standards of appropriate action 
should be (see NCTAUS, 2004b: 210, note 241; see also Mazzetti, 2013). 
Assassination was contentious for the CIA to perform, at least before September 11, 
2001, both under US law and by bureaucratic conventions).7 As James Pavitt, Deputy 
Director for Operations (1999–2004), would explain, “we don’t do policy from 
Langley … and you don’t want us to” (NCTAUS, 2004a).8 Testimony in the 9/11 
Commission report states: 
[T]wo senior CIA officers told us they would have been morally and 
practically opposed to getting CIA into what might look like an 
assassination. One of them, a former CTC chief, said he would have 
refused an order to directly kill Bin Ladin [sic]. (NCTAUS, 2004a) 
As Richard Clarke, adviser to the White House on counterterrorism under both 
Clinton and later Bush, explained: 
The corporate view inside CIA was, “We don’t want to do covert 
action. And if we do covert action, we want it to be neat and clean. We 
don’t want to be involved in killing people. Because we’re not like that. 
We’re not Mossad.” (Mazzetti, 2013)9 
These statements are consistent with “norm dissociation.” Assassination was 
meaningfully prohibited, and opponents of targeted killing within the US’s security 
  
apparatus made meaningful reference to that prohibition. Yet, after September 11, 
2001, the CIA did develop a targeted killing program and began strikes in 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen. So, that prohibition either died or changed in 
content. 
A significant indication that “norm death” is also not what happened may be 
seen in the Obama administration’s approach to targeted killing — which 
differentiated targeted killing from assassination, rather than defended assassination 
itself. One clue to this process is a State Department White Paper confidentially 
provided to members of the Senate Intelligence and Judiciary Committees in June 
2012, which outlined much of the Obama administration’s case for targeted killing in 
general. Besides establishing a regulatory framework, it fulfilled another key purpose: 
to explicitly differentiate such killings from “assassinations” (Department of Justice, 
2012) on both international and domestic legal grounds. 
The evidence suggests that for this case — and perhaps for similar possible 
cases10 — relevant norms persisted in name but came to define or extend to different 
practices over time. They transformed. In the next section, I posit an explanation 
emphasizing the role of ethical and strategic innovation as drivers of transformation. 
 
Three mechanisms of normative transformation 
I propose that three causal mechanisms drove the normative transformations 
underlying the emergence and institutionalization of the US’s targeted killing 
program. This proposal rests on two bases. One is a prima facie plausibility test: the 
evidence I have collected suggests that some interaction of technology, normative 
framing, and bureaucratic politics propelled the rise of targeted killing. Actors revised 
institutional norms alongside their practices in recursive ways, meaning that 
counterterrorism efficacy influenced normative discourses, just as norms influenced 
discourses on strategic choice. Meanwhile, norms provided both guidance to actors 
and institutional resources for contesting various practices. As these forces stand out 
as important, I offer a theory that gives them adequate analytical attention. The second 
basis lies in existing literature on norm change and on institutional transformations. 
To varying degrees, technology, framing and discourse, and bureaucratic politics are 
all part of existing theories of norm change. This scholarship provide guidance on how 
  
best to more formally and systematically specify and trace how they worked in this 
case. 
The first mechanism, convention reorientation, refers to the reframing of a 
situation to entail different obligations, actor identities, and local ends. Unlike in norm 
contestation, actors are not disputing the legitimacy of a rule or principle, but instead 
repositioning themselves so as to be outside its scope. Versions of this appear in the 
literature on framing (Barnett, 1999; Payne, 2001) and “rhetorical coercion” (Krebs 
and Jackson, 2007), ontological security-seeking (Rumelili, 2015), and securitization 
theory (Buzan et al., 1998). Shannon (2000), in particular, explores debates over 
whether an action falls within the regulatory scope of a norm, termed “justification,” 
through a psychological framework.11 The common thread is that the way in which a 
situation is classified situates it in particular normative configurations, and 
reclassifying that situation often moves it to a completely new such configuration. As 
classifications are the outcomes of creative and competitive transactions, they fit well 
within a relational theoretical framework such as the one I use here. Moreover, a 
pragmatist perspective takes this beyond a purely instrumental account of framing or 
of strategic speech-acts to include how actors are themselves changed along with their 
situations. 
This mechanism is most salient to situations where actors’ options, such as the 
employment of political violence, are highly defined by conventions; switching the 
context of those conventions reveals a new horizon of possible action. For example, 
by framing its counterterrorism practices as a war, rather than policing, the US placed 
them within the broader normative framework of Just War theory and outside of the 
domestic justice system, which, in turn, implies certain obligations of proportionality 
and discrimination, codified in international law and liberal political thought 
(Crawford, 2003). This was facilitated by widespread anguish and anger in the 
aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, which helped unsettle or shock the existing institutional 
environment. When critics of US practices employ the language of crime and 
punishment, such as by referring to killings as “extra-judicial executions” (see, e.g., 
Kretzmer, 2005), they are also seeking to reorient the situation such that a different 
set of conventions apply — ones that permit far less extensive violence and entail far 
greater institutional oversight. Over time, these discursive maneuvers generate 
broader transformations, with changed classifications and their associated 
conventions crystallizing into new normative configurations. 
  
The second mechanism, technological revision, refers to the shifting of action 
through new media of intervention into the world — both new objects and skills — 
which carry different normative connotations and enable new forms of transactions 
subject to different regulative conditions. As noted, technological innovation is 
directed by value-driven and cultural processes, and is only one part of a broader set 
of enabling conditions making normative transformation possible at a systematic 
scale. Technological determinism is alone wholly inadequate to understand this, but 
an analysis that omits technology ignores key instrumental factors — on this view, 
technology does not determine actors’ choice of actions, but rather offers new 
possibilities to them, for them to evaluate, select, or synthesize as they see fit. 
Again, IR scholars have attended to some aspects of this mechanism in 
existing work. Macro-historical research into the material foundations of international 
systems (Deudney, 2000) and into the complexification of war (Bousquet, 2008) are 
two such examples, while Carvin and Williams (2014), who take an explicitly 
practice-theoretical approach to look at the emergence of a liberal way of war, offer a 
third. A fourth lies in the IR-adjacent literature in political geography on materialism 
and war (Grayson, 2016; Holmqvist, 2013; Shaw, 2013). The pragmatist take on this 
mechanism differs from others through its emphasis on the relationship between 
technological development and creative possibility, with new means of action 
disclosing new horizons of ends and values. As technological change makes it 
possible to do things differently, it produces new ethical solutions and problems. 
The third mechanism, network synthesis, refers to the synthetic combination 
of social networks into new coalitions able to authorize new actions and reform social 
arrangements, entailing new normative configurations. When new relationships are 
formed between actors, they generate new authorities, such as through chains of 
command, crossing bureaucratic boundaries, or the delegation of tasks. This 
mechanism is most salient to situations where insurgent actors emerge or where 
existing networks are, as with convention reorientation, unsettled by exogenous 
shocks. In many respects, network synthesis has already been the subject of sustained 
attention by norms scholars. For example, in their account of the demise of the 
transatlantic slave trade, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) study the successes of 
Christian activists in influencing the British government to employ naval power 
against ships involved in transporting slaves. Acharya (2004) also examines a form of 
network synthesis in how individual states “localize” international conventions, 
  
gaining influential foreign support but reshaping those conventions in the process. 
More recently, studies of private security companies show how closer ties between 
government elites and corporate executives challenge and transform perceptions of 
mercenaries and of legitimate combatants (Avant, 2005, 2016; Percy, 2007). Network 
synthesis has thus been well studied as a mechanism of alliance building. Yet, it also 
builds worlds, resulting in often sweeping transformations of norms as actors engage 
the novel situations. 
In line with a Bayesian approach to process-tracing, I identify key observations 
that, if they obtain, should increase confidence in my explanation over others, such as 
norm dissociation, norm death, or the predominance of one mechanism over the others 
(Humphreys and Jacobs, 2015; Musgrave and Nexon, 2018). While process-tracing 
may take a range of methodological forms (Bennett and Checkel, 2015), this approach 
makes transparent my selection of single case-study evidence: I focus on the 
institutional processes especially likely to yield evidence of the operation of these 
three mechanisms in particular — the presence of which is enough to warrant some 
confidence in the explanation I offer. In other words, the more the case evinces these 
mechanisms, the more confidence is warranted to accept that they account for the 
underlying causal story. Convention reorientation implies key discussions around 
definitions. Specifically, there should be clear evidence of a definitional dispute, the 
outcome of which determines the essential normative valance of a contested practice 
— whether the practice is permissible will depend on its place within an already 
articulated set of conventions, and thus discourse revolves around not whether an 
action is right or wrong, but which conventional framework should apply. 
Technological revision implies that the development of new tools plays a notable role 
in making normatively contentious action more palatable — that it resolves moral or 
strategic dilemmas in ways that empower proponents of the action over opponents. 
Finally, network synthesis should imply clear evidence of bureaucratic alliance-
making as a key component to the triumph of a “winning coalition” of proponents of 
a normative transformation, and of the new practices or actions associated with it (see 
Table 2). 
Table 2. 
The mechanisms of normative transformation and their observable implications. 
Mechanism Normative effect Observable implication 
  
Convention 
reorientation 
Redefines the frame of a situation 
to involve a new set of laws, 
authorities, agents, and agencies, 
changing its normative 
dimensions. 
Definitional disputes over 
action classification, rather 
than over overarching 
legal/moral principles. 
Technological 
revision 
Shifts action onto new media of 
intervention into the world, 
establishing new means with 
different normative connotations 
to their use. 
Use of new tools to reduce 
the moral/strategic costs of a 
contentious action. 
Network 
synthesis 
Brings actors together in new 
ways, creating new alliances able 
to authorize new kinds of action. 
Partnerships of actors from 
different institutional 
networks to push a common 
agenda. 
 
The War on Terror and the transformation of the 
prohibition on assassination 
Here, I give a phased account of targeted killing by the US, reviewing the institutional 
history of each phase and discussing the ways in which the evidence on this case 
attests to the operation of the three causal mechanisms. I outline what the prohibition 
on assassination actually is, and describe how it was embedded within US institutions, 
with particular attention to where it was strong and weak in terms of how disposed 
officials or practitioners were to avoiding actions proscribed under it. Then, I trace the 
emergence of targeted killing through the early normative and organizational changes 
accompanying it during its gradual development as a regular practice under the Bush 
administration. Finally, I trace the full normalization and institutionalization of 
targeted killing as a major military and counterterrorism instrument under the Obama 
administration. 
 
Phase zero: The prohibition on assassination and targeted killing 
  
Initially, targeted killing too closely resembled assassination to be embraced as a 
military or counterterrorism instrument. In international convention, formal and 
informal, the prohibition on assassination dates back several centuries and has been a 
factor in discouraging the killing of both political leaders (Thomas, 2001) and military 
officers (Solis, 2010), as hunting/killing “named” individuals lay outside the 
boundaries of permissible killing in war. This was bound up in operational 
assumptions about how assassination would work: while ambushes were permitted in 
times of war, the infiltration of undercover operatives appeared “perfidious” and was 
therefore forbidden. Moreover, assassination was associated primarily with political 
disputes between conflicting elites, wherein the method and the target sat outside 
normative military affairs (Thomas, 2001). Without technology or tactics that allowed 
uniformed forces to target specific persons, Western military norms cemented 
assassination as illegitimate by nature, nearly impossible to perform honorably. 
Meanwhile, although this international prohibition has not stopped the US 
government from getting involved in “assassination-like” activities in the past, strong 
legal and informal conventions against the practice developed by the late 1980s. A 
history of scandal — mainly associated with the CIA’s involvement in Latin American 
coups — and a lack of institutional memory surrounding the use of assassination in 
counter-insurgency meant that CIA officials “grew up” in an environment where 
targeted killing was seen as prohibited in the minds of many within the CIA and in 
other arms of government, at least before September 11, 2001.12 
Assassination was explicitly forbidden by Executive Order 11905, signed into 
law in 1976 by President Gerald Ford — “No employee of the United States 
Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, political assassination” — and 
reinforced by Executive Order 12036, signed in 1978 by President Jimmy Carter. The 
1976 ban on assassination came after the public investigation and exposure of a 
number of unsuccessful CIA operations to assassinate foreign leaders, and established 
firm boundaries constraining the scope available to the US intelligence community 
for covert action. As Grayson (2016: 54) notes, this ban was “generously narrow” and 
geared more toward mechanisms of transparency and executive control rather than 
permanent prohibition; indeed, employing the legal instrument of an executive order 
may have been to specifically pre-empt a legislative ban, which would have denied 
future presidents the power to approve of assassinations should they see fit. 
  
Nevertheless, until overridden, the executive order carried legal and institutional 
weight, redirecting the CIA away from any routine paramilitary operations. 
Beyond its apparent illegality, assassination also fell within the range of 
activities associated with “policy” rather than intelligence collection, which ran afoul 
of the principles internalized by the CIA in the wake of the Iran-Contra scandal. As 
previously quoted, James Pavitt’s testimony to the 9/11 Commission was that “we 
don’t do policy from Langley” (NCTAUS, 2004a),13 and further testimony suggests 
that senior CIA officials would have refused direct orders to engage in assassination. 
To repeat Richard Clarke’s claim: “We don’t want to be involved in killing people. 
Because we’re not like that. We’re not Mossad” (quoted in Mazzetti, 2013). 
Finally, the targeted killing or assassination of terrorists ran a high risk of 
unacceptable harm to bystanders. This is well illustrated by the way in which President 
Clinton approached an opportunity to kill Bin Laden in mid-September 2000. In a trial 
run for expanding Predator UAVs as a surveillance platform, one pilot observed a 
figure apparently matching Bin Laden’s description at Bin Laden’s Tarnak Farms 
compound outside Kandahar (NCTAUS, 2004a: 190). Clinton was unwilling to 
approve a cruise missile strike as the settlement likely contained children (Coll, 2004). 
By refusing, at least up until that point, to engage in targeted killing, the executive 
branch of the US government lent the prohibition strength, hitching it to other 
conventions regarding the distribution of powers across the arms of the state — 
according to which the CIA was not to engage in killing — and to a particular, liberal 
vision for US military activities in a post-Cold War era. It was not just the direct 
prohibition on assassination that forbade targeted killing, but broader cosmopolitan 
norms concerning interventions abroad. 
This is consistent with expectations stemming from the explanation that this 
article advances. First, it shows how key actors both defined targeted killing as 
assassination and were opposed to it on that basis, as well as on the basis of deeper 
institutional conventions concerning the appropriate powers of the CIA versus other 
arms of the US defense and security apparatus. Second, it shows that despite the 
obvious role that advanced technology has since then played in the US’s use of 
targeted killing, major objections also revolved around propriety rather than solely the 
absence of adequately precise means. The form that opposition to targeted killing took 
thus makes norm dissociation unlikely, while suggesting that whatever changes later 
took place cannot solely be a product of the technological revision mechanism alone. 
  
However, the prohibition was weaker in the CIA’s Counter-Terrorism Center 
(CTC). Established during the Reagan administration, its first director, Duane 
“Dewey” Clarridge, was chosen precisely for his bellicose and action-oriented 
reputation. Clarridge pushed for a pre-emptive, global counterterrorist doctrine 
making use of elite military forces, and even appears to have proposed the use of 
armed drones, though this project did not come to fruition before he was sacked in the 
wake of the Iran-Contra scandal (Fuller, 2017). Thus, the CTC was established from 
its outset to approach terrorism through more bellicose means, and to employ and train 
personnel to accept targeting and direct action as legitimate. It diverged, in normative 
make-up and practical orientation, from the rest of the CIA. The global orientation of 
the CTC, and its mandate to target violent non-state groups rather than to conduct 
more traditional intelligence duties, placed it at the seam between espionage and 
military action, in a unique, novel, institutional space where the conventions of neither 
were clear. Hence, it was constituted in ways at odds with the conventions and 
practices on which normative opposition to assassination rested. 
 
Phase one: The emergence of targeted killing 
The potential for significant transformations in the US’s stance toward targeted killing 
lay in a combination of new technology and a new executive orientation toward the 
use of military force abroad. Attempts to arm the MQ-1 Predator — initially designed 
for surveillance — proceeded throughout the late 1990s, with successful tests taking 
place throughout 2001 (Whittle, 2014). A Predator armed with a Hellfire anti-tank 
missile offered a far more discriminating use of force than did a cruise missile, which 
had previously been considered and rejected as a means of targeting Bin Laden 
(Fuller, 2017). As one source explained, it offered a “little boom” rather than the “big 
boom” produced by larger ordnance (Roger Cressey, interview with author), and, 
crucially, did not require commandos to invade another sovereign country, which did 
not entail the risk of dead American personnel. Also significant were improvements 
in electronic and signals intelligence collection, offering new opportunities to learn 
the locations of targets in time to strike them (Miller et al., 2013).14 These 
technological developments reassured the US government of its ability to remain 
within the normative parameters of cosmopolitan warfare, and, in turn, allowed the 
  
CIA to remain within its own normative aversion to high-profile military or 
paramilitary adventures — am institutional legacy still potent outside of the CTC. 
Yet, technological advances were not the only factors enabling normative 
change. According to available accounts, the possibility of using drones to carry out 
targeted killings was first raised by Cofer Black, the director of the CTC, in mid-2000. 
Black, alongside Clarke, had been searching for a way to damage al-Qa’ida and 
Osama Bin Laden. However, the suggestion that the CIA should engage in targeted 
killing met with strong bureaucratic opposition (Mazzetti, 2013). DCI George Tenet, 
in particular, was highly resistant to the prospect of his organization engaging in what 
appeared to be assassination: 
Tenet in particular questioned whether he, as Director of Central 
Intelligence, should operate an armed Predator. “This was new 
ground,” he told us. Tenet ticked off key questions: What is the chain 
of command? Who takes the shot? Are America’s leaders comfortable 
with the CIA doing this, going outside of normal military command 
and control? Charlie Allen told us that when these questions were 
discussed at the CIA, he and the Agency’s executive director, A. B. 
“Buzzy” Krongard, had said that either one of them would be happy to 
pull the trigger, but Tenet was appalled, telling them that they had no 
authority, nor did he. (NCTAUS, 2004b: 210, note 241) 
Tenet’s reticence, though not shared by all beneath him in the CIA’s hierarchy, 
represented settled institutional norms concerning authority and the use of force, and 
delayed further serious consideration of the use of CIA resources to engage in any 
killings for over a year. Indeed, in July 2001, the US government made a firm public 
statement against targeted killings when its ambassador to Israel, Martin Indyk, 
condemned Israel’s targeting of Palestinians suspected of terrorism: “The United 
States government is very clearly on record as against targeted assassinations…. They 
are extrajudicial killings, and we do not support that” (Meyer, 2009). Thus, publicly 
and internally, significant normative transformation had yet to take place. 
However, even prior to the 9/11 attacks and the “War on Terror,” the new Bush 
administration sought to circumvent the opposition of the CIA leadership to targeted 
killing by soliciting ideas from lower-ranking members of the Agency. Despite 
opposition to extensive CIA involvement in “policy,” Clarke was looking into ways 
of striking Bin Laden by mid-2000. He went as far as holding a meeting including 
  
targeted killing’s main advocates in the CIA and the Department of Defense but 
excluded Tenet (Mazzetti, 2013). Nevertheless, Clarke’s enthusiasm for targeted 
killing was not limitless: 
We didn’t want to create a broad precedent that would allow 
intelligence officials in the future to have hit lists and routinely engage 
in something that approximated assassination [and] create an 
American hit list that would become an ongoing institution that we 
could just keep adding names to and have hit teams go out and 
assassinate people. (Quoted in Scahill, 2013) 
Black’s standing enthusiasm for paramilitary counterterrorism, however, was well 
known to his colleagues, representing the more bellicose disposition of the CTC. With 
the Bush administration interested in aggressive responses, he became a popular figure 
at the White House. Black and the CTC were given the authority to begin targeted 
killings, following a White House briefing to which only Black, senior CTC 
personnel, and select foreign intelligence officials were invited (Scahill, 2013). 
Moreover, the legal permissions offered by the new Authorization for the Use of 
Military Force (AUMF), passed on 14 September 2001 and authorizing the use of 
military forces against those responsible for the attacks, introduced a broad military 
logic to the CIA’s counterterrorism initiatives — a point emphasized to me by a 
former counterterrorism adviser to the Bush administration (Roger Cressey, interview 
with author). In other words, executives in the Bush administration outmaneuvered 
Tenet to partner with a lower-ranking official from an insurgent, and until then 
relatively subordinated, subsection of the CIA who had no distaste for clandestine 
killing, and empowered those in favor with a new set of conventions governing the 
use of force against terrorists. 
Here, it is helpful to explicitly revisit the observational implications of the 
proposed causal mechanisms, and consider whether they obtain. The use of new 
technology to overcome the disadvantages of previous means — both operational and 
normative — is the easiest to discern. This strongly attests to the role of technological 
revision. Moreover, the importance of executive enthusiasm for aggressive 
counterterrorism is consistent with network synthesis; the intervention of the White 
House in support of targeted killing proponents neutralized CIA officials opposed to 
it. Perhaps hardest to discern in this phase is convention reorientation. It may be 
possible to imagine all this taking place without redefinition of targeted killing; more 
  
consistent with norm death, this explanation would simply point to new technologies 
and executive impetus. There are, however, two indications of convention 
reorientation here. First is the importance of the AUMF in resituating counterterrorism 
activities within a logic of armed conflict. Second, though a weaker indicator, is that 
after the US government initially referred to Israel’s targeted killings as 
“extrajudicial” executions, suggesting a criminal justice framework, this objection 
ceased to matter within the US’s security apparatus and executive. Indeed, there is 
little evidence that it received serious consideration once the US began to set up its 
own targeted killing program, suggesting an easy shift into a “laws of armed conflict” 
normative framework. However, clearer evidence of convention reorientation can be 
found in the actions of the Obama administration. 
 
Phase two: The institutionalization of targeted killing 
Despite the reorientation of the CIA toward targeted killing engineered by the Bush 
administration, with its supporters within the CIA, the practice met with mixed 
reception from the defense community at large. As former CIA General Counsel 
Jeffrey Smith claimed in an interview with the Washington Post, targeted killings may 
“suggest that it’s acceptable behavior to assassinate people…. Assassination as a norm 
of international conduct exposes American leaders and Americans overseas” (Meyer, 
2009). However, the Bush administration and the CTC, which had significantly grown 
in size and influence within the CIA, were certain that drone strikes were dealing a 
significant blow to al-Qa’ida. Both the CIA and the Defense Department, with its own 
expanded counterterrorism infrastructure, had largely accepted their roles as 
counterterrorists fighting on a global battlefield. At this point, however, targeted 
killing was not yet as widespread and well institutionalized as it would become under 
the Obama administration. 
As noted earlier, when President Obama took office, he might have limited or 
put a halt to further targeted killings, but he instead did the opposite: he escalated and 
expanded the program. Within the first year, the Obama administration had presided 
over more strikes than the Bush administration had in its entire eight years in office 
(Meyer, 2009), and Obama took a far more personal role in the program, signing off 
on lists of targets in weekly meetings between himself and the director of the CIA. By 
micromanaging, Obama injected executive authority into the CIA’s targeting 
  
practices, directly legitimating expansions in the scope and pace of targeting. There 
are two reasons why Obama may have done this. The first was to wage a “good” fight 
against al-Qa’ida while withdrawing from the “bad” fight that the Bush administration 
had started in Iraq. The second, at least according to some within the government, was 
that after Obama permanently shuttered the CIA’s infamous “enhanced interrogation” 
program, targeted killings became a more significant defense against terrorism 
(Scahill, 2013). As less information was available to the CIA, the killings had to shift 
from a pre-emptive to a preventive mode, lest another major attack against the US 
take place and result in great political cost. Although this second reason may imply a 
rather more cynical calculus, both highlight the perceived value of targeted killing as 
a key instrument for the Obama administration to fight terrorism while differentiating 
their approach to the War on Terror from that of their predecessors.15 
One of the clearest indicators of the Obama administration’s attempts to 
legally normalize targeted killing is a leaked, undated State Department White 
Paper.16 Entitled “Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed Against a U.S. Citizen 
who is a Senior Operational Leader of Al Qa’ida or An Associated Force,” it was 
confidentially provided to members of the Senate Intelligence and Judiciary 
Committees in June 2012. The memo went beyond simply outlining the circumstances 
under which a US citizen may be targeted and killed to state, in legal language, much 
of the Obama administration’s case for targeted killing in general. First, it firmly 
differentiated such killings from “assassinations”: 
In the Department’s view, a lethal operation conducted against a U.S. 
citizen whose conduct poses an imminent threat of violent attack 
against the United States would be a legitimate act of national self-
defense that would not violate the assassination ban. Similarly, the use 
of lethal force, consistent with the laws of war, against an individual 
who is a legitimate military target would be lawful and would not 
violate the assassination ban. (Department of Justice, 2012) 
Second, it stated when targeting is permissible, including a broad definition of 
imminent threat: 
The condition that an operational leader present an “imminent” threat 
of violent attack against the United States does not require the United 
States to have clear evidence that a specific attack on U.S. persons and 
  
interests will take place in the immediate future. (Department of 
Justice, 2012) 
Two other conditions must also be fulfilled: “law of war principles” must, in general, 
be followed, and capture, at least when an American citizen is the target, must be 
practically unfeasible without considerable risk to US personnel. 
It is here that convention reorientation can best be observed as efforts to define 
targeted killing as something distinct from assassination are the clearest indication 
that this mechanism is at work. Not just a move within legal discourse, this was a 
bureaucratic and institutional move as well given the formal and informal channels 
through which the law influences the normative sensitivities and orientations of the 
CIA. If the Obama administration could simply have decided, regardless of legal or 
conventional status, to escalate and institutionalize targeted killing, there would be no 
reason for the White Paper. By intervening in the definitional dispute over whether 
targeted killing was or was not assassination, therefore, the administration’s actions 
attest to the operation of something other than just the network synthesis mechanism. 
By this point, the case is complete, with the US’s targeted killing program 
looking more or less as it does today: normalized, employed in numerous locales, and 
a fixture of political discourse on countering terrorism. Its development was first 
driven by technological change and institutional maneuvering in which the Bush 
administration partnered with “insurgent” CIA bureaucrats willing to flout 
conventions, and later by a new administration that saw the killings as an effective 
way to leave behind the unpopular security practices of its predecessor, while dealing 
with threats in regions where other military actions carried their own problems with 
them. 
 
Summary 
All three proposed mechanisms generated institutional change — in norms, in 
organizational structure, and in practices. The first phase occurred over a period of 
successful institutional politicking during the initial years of the Bush administration, 
and most clearly shows these mechanisms operating not just simultaneously, but also 
synthetically. Convention reorientation occurred as counterterrorism shifted into a 
military institutional framework, constituted by legal and bureaucratic configurations 
more permissive of directed, lethal force as a legitimate first choice of action. 
  
Technological revision was a major enabling process, starting even before 
counterterrorism became a “war,” and facilitated targeted killing by offering a means 
of remaining within liberal standards of discrimination and proportionality. Network 
synthesis, enabled by the entrance of a new administration, allowed CIA officials 
supportive of targeted killing to triumph over their previously more powerful internal 
rivals, providing the authorities and institutional pathways to reform the practices and 
structures of the organization. Crucially, it is hard to imagine any of these mechanisms 
working in isolation from the others in this case; the interaction effect of all three in 
concert explains how targeted killing first arose. 
Further transformation took place during the initial years of the Obama 
administration, which sought to legally normalize and institutionalize targeted killing 
as a major policy instrument, beyond what Bush-era proponents such as Clarke had 
originally desired. Technological revision diminished in salience: although both 
UAVs and surveillance technology continued to increase in sophistication, the major 
development — a means of precision killing — had already occurred. Rather, 
convention reorientation and network synthesis interacted, with Obama’s increased 
personal involvement injecting executive authority into the targeted killing program, 
and measures of legal normalization shifting the killings from a state of exception to 
a well-defined institutional role.17 This transformation was not essentially tied to the 
use of armed UAVs — the killing of Bin Laden by a commando team in a highly risky 
and daring operation shows this; nevertheless, it was closely bound up with the routine 
and relatively risk-free targeting capabilities afforded by aircraft that allowed for 
sustained surveillance, a relatively precise use of force (in comparison to a cruise 
missile or multi-party firefight), and a complete absence of US personnel on foreign 
ground and in the line of fire. Of the two periods of transformation, the first was 
undoubtedly the most major, but the second is nevertheless an illustration of how 
mechanisms of normative transformation work. 
 
Broader implications for theorizing institutional and 
normative change 
The explanation I advance here is consistent with the notion of “punctuated 
equilibrium” as an explanation of institutional change — a long-standing concept in 
  
historical institutionalism (Hall and Taylor, 1996). As Fligstein and McAdam (2012) 
argue, exogenous shocks to a field upset its stability and give challengers 
opportunities when they would otherwise be defeated by incumbent actors defending 
the status quo. While major events can unsettle established norms and practices, there 
must still be a process of recognition and mobilization by challengers for change to 
take place. This occurred within the CIA. The 9/11 attacks profoundly influenced both 
the security bureaucracy and US politics in general, reducing the risk posed by the 
exposure to the public of aggressive covert operations and giving the Bush 
administration the impetus to bypass the CIA hierarchy. While Clarke’s concerns 
show the lingering power of the prohibition upon the attitudes even of officials in 
favor of the program, Black’s willingness to expand and restructure the CTC supplied 
the requisite institutional and technical means to overcome the prior conventions that 
guided Tenet and other objectors. 
More than a case study of institutional change, however, this article is an 
enquiry into the origins and evolutions of a prohibition — it theorizes norm 
transformation. It shows that the targeted killing prohibition arose out of a 
constellation of normative bases. The relationship between a “norm” against 
assassination and the US’s use of targeted killing is not determinable absent the 
institutional context in which that norm is constituted, with local particularities 
shaping the limits and connotations of the prohibition. Moreover, it shows how 
changes in norm compliance and interpretation may arise from a range of discursive, 
technological, and bureaucratic factors, and that this is, effectively, a kind of 
normative transformation in itself. 
The study of institutional change is thus relevant to one of the key research 
programs of IR research over the past two-and-a-half decades: the effects of existing 
international norms and the emergence of new ones. This literature began in the 1990s 
and early 2000s, and uncovered a normative dimension to the conduct of international 
politics in a discipline otherwise consumed by rationalist debates over the comparable 
merits of neorealism and neoliberalism (Hoffmann, 2010; for examples, see, among 
others, Barkin and Cronin, 1994; Finnemore, 1996; Katzenstein, 1996; Kratochwil, 
1989; Kratochwil and Ruggie, 1986; Nadelmann, 1990). At the forefront of this 
research program were studies into the emergence and spread of prohibitions (Keck 
and Sikkink, 1998; Price, 1995; Tannenwald, 1999), and it grew to posit complex 
models of the “life cycles” of norms (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; see also, among 
  
others, Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Klotz, 1995). In the early 2000s, a second wave of 
norms scholarship studied how existing norms manifest in varying ways, and how 
norm compliance differs across contexts (Hoffmann, 2010; for examples, see, among 
others, Acharya, 2004; Krook and True, 2012; Sandholtz, 2008; Wiener, 2004, 2008), 
but, until recently, paid relatively little attention to intra-institutional factors and the 
role of practitioners. Some scholars have thus called for more investigation of local 
agency (Bucher, 2014; Hofferberth and Weber, 2015), and reached for increasingly 
sophisticated sociological perspectives on the dynamics of contestation and creativity 
within disputes over norms (Kornprobst, 2007; Schmidt, 2014; Wiener, 2008, 2014). 
The approach I use here contributes to that effort, if understood in terms of 
practice theory and sociological pragmatism. Characteristic of both is a focus on 
practitioners, processes of transformation in single cases, and configurational analysis 
(Adler and Pouliot, 2011; Adler-Nissan, 2013; Büger and Gadinger, 2015; Friedrichs 
and Kratochwil, 2009; Jackson and Nexon, 1999; see also Depélteau, 2013; Elias, 
1994; Linklater 2011), and scholars working from their premises have been critical of 
more mainstream research on norms (Jackson et al., 2004). Despite recent suggestions 
that these approaches are in opposition to dominant constructivist scholarship 
(McCourt, 2016), the three mechanisms traced in this article are sensitive to precisely 
those dynamics of contestation and agency, in large part, because they proceed from 
an understanding of practice based in pragmatism, rather than Bourdieu’s more 
structuralist account.18 They avoid reifying “norms” as theoretical objects — meaning 
that norms do not play an explanatory role as cognitive proxies for more primitive 
processes of institutionalization and legitimation, themselves driven by problem-
solving action. Rather, my explanation focuses less on norms per se and more on the 
normative dimensions of a host of practices by officials concerned with the authorities 
and strategies they take to be necessary for effective security policies. This highlights 
the practical, complex, and often multivalent normative character of contentious 
actions in ways that can be obscured or shoved into an abstract ideational realm when 
encapsulated within the conceptual container of “norm.” 
Moreover, my explanation takes seriously the role of technology in the 
transformation of norms: not just a source of moral and strategic problems and 
solutions, it is a force for actors to remake themselves, entangled with broader 
processes of normative and institutional reformation. By orienting explanation around 
mechanisms attesting to these variables, rather than solely on discourse or decision 
  
theory, I take actors to be as plastic as structures. New technology alters identities and 
authorities in ways that may not change which norms are applicable, but does change 
how those norms are applied. Certainly, technology is part of existing accounts of 
norm change — one cannot talk about weapons taboos, for example, without talking 
about weapons — but its role in interpretation and contestation is especially clear 
given the emphasis that practice theory and pragmatism place on the materiality of 
cognition and social interaction. Granting a broader role to technology also ties in 
existing scholarship from other approaches already attentive to this dimension. 
Studies into liberalism and its attendant mode of warfare explicitly trace the history 
of drones and targeted killing (Carvin and Williams, 2014; Grayson, 2016; Shaw, 
2013), and consider the cultural implications of their use (Holmqvist, 2013; Wilcox, 
2017). Carvin and Williams (2014) examine the broad historical transformation of 
warfare, and the others focus on the normative implications of technology rather than 
the causal origins of its evolution and institutionalization. My approach shares their 
sensitivities but operationalizes that normative dimension through a mechanism-based 
etiology applied to a specific case. 
Finally, and most broadly, I foregrounded the reciprocal relationship between 
ends and means — between the normative and the strategic — by showing how 
perceptions of appropriate or legitimate conduct change in concert with political and 
practical problem-solving.19 This illustrates the transformational potential lying even 
in local and immediate situations of social interaction — a subject of ongoing creative 
meta-theorizing (Adler, forthcoming) and political critique (Cochran, 2012). Studying 
the reciprocity of normativity and strategy orients recent attempts by scholars to revisit 
classical realism and critically evaluate the direction of mainstream constructivist 
research (Barkin, 2003; Levine, 2012). While these themes exist in more mainstream 
conversations in norms scholarship to a limited degree (see, e.g., Hofferberth and 
Weber, 2015; Schmidt, 2014; Wiener, 2014), they do so from first premises. In 
starting with an empirical rather than meta-theoretical puzzle, as I have done, scholars 
working in these new traditions can engage with and propel more mainstream research 
programs as a whole. The result should be a plurality of progressive approaches and 
a livelier conversation on the facets of the problems to which they may be applied, 
new or enduring. 
 
  
Conclusion 
The emergence and institutionalization of the US’s targeted killing program was not 
the demise of a norm, but its transformation. Drawing on insights from pragmatist and 
relational sociology, I traced the operation of three causal mechanisms — convention 
reorientation, technological revision, and network synthesis — to show how the 
prohibition on assassination changed. Initially, both opponents and proponents of 
targeted killing within the CIA were concerned that it would violate that prohibition, 
but as the CIA paramilitarized, as UAVs became more sophisticated, and as executive 
pressure mounted for aggressive counterterrorism, these concerns diminished. Then, 
under the Obama administration, targeted killing became institutionally entrenched, 
with an accompanying legal infrastructure that fully normalized it and differentiated 
it from assassination. All the while, however, actors averred that a prohibition on 
assassination existed and that they were not violating it. 
This analysis does not just give an internal account of the history of a 
contentious practice; it offers a theory of norm transformation not focused on the life 
cycle of norms as reified social objects, but through an investigation of institutional 
change. Practices often evolve without neat divisions between old and new norms, 
knitting together a range of ethical and strategic problem-solving activities. This 
approach is well suited to investigating the enormous shifts that the US security 
apparatus has undergone over the past two decades as they feature a complex 
entanglement of laws, threat adaptations, and advanced science and technology. 
Targeted killing is one case of the foregoing; others may include the CIA’s use of 
torture and the widespread deployment of armed private military contractors in 
warzones. The latter two also feature not just new interpretations of old conventions, 
but also a similar embrace of new skills and devices.20 If so, the approach may be 
“portable” beyond the idiosyncrasies of this one case, offering a substantive 
theoretical and methodological addition to the research on norms and institutions in 
international relations. 
At the same time, it locates a thematic overlap between discrete research 
programs on norms and on techno-social configurations (such as “new materialism” 
and its relatives). The latter accounts for a normative dimension to technology but 
does not focus on the way in which an arrangement of means and artifacts binds 
specific conventions to specific practices. Norm entrepreneurship can thus target or 
  
propel technological development, and the normative implications of techno-social 
configurations are not, so to speak, value-neutral — they favor some possible norm 
transformations over others. While this article primarily speaks to scholars of norms, 
it also shows where these other research programs have something to gain, especially 
when knitted together through a pragmatist sensitivity to creativity, evolutionary 
process, and configurational theorizing. 
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Notes 
1. Comparisons may also be made with similar studies of Israel’s targeted killing 
program (Craig-Jones, 2015; Guiora, 2004; Pratt, 2013) but space constraints preclude 
their inclusion here. 
2. With the exception of Jose (2017), who examines the status of the normative 
shift but not the institutional process leading to it. 
3. This relational view of agency is drawn from Emirbayer and Mische (1998). 
It turns on an understanding of creativity and action developed by Joas (1996). 
4. One methodological advantage of focusing on practices as “maneuvers” is that 
it overcomes the problem of concealed perceptions; intelligence officials, and political 
operators in general, are skilled at concealing or dissembling when questioned about 
their views, and the relational, “external” nature of practices fixes attention on what 
actors do rather than what they think. 
5. For these statistics and others pertaining to the US’s use of armed UAVs, see: 
https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Every-
confirmed-US-drone-strike-in-Pakistan-Yemen-and-Somalia-recorded-by-the-
Bureau-2002-20121.jpg (accessed May 1, 2017). 
6. This bifurcation of non-compliance into death and dissociation is an atypical 
way of organizing disparate literatures on norms but highlights some deep 
commonalities in theme. 
  
7. While the CIA had been involved in activities resembling assassination, it had 
never done so with great scale or systematicity. The closest thing to what the targeted 
killing would become was the “Phoenix Program,” in which US intelligence services 
cooperated with South Vietnamese security forces to locate insurgent cadres, but this 
program was not specifically devoted to killing, even if summary executions or lethal 
exchanges of fire led to the deaths of many of those targeted (Roseneau and Long, 
2009). 
8. Tenet’s reluctance is not unique; during the mid-1980s, President Reagan’s 
security executive made some attempts to establish CIA-run teams of local 
commandos to target and kill terrorists in Lebanon but was forced to scrap the plan in 
the face of strong resistance from both the CIA and the State Department, both of 
which cited the illegality of assassination and the likelihood of strong public relations 
blowback should the operation be exposed (Mazzetti, 2013). 
9. As an editorial note, be aware that many of these sources are either 
unpaginated or digital, such as in the case of Mazzetti, whose “e-print” version of his 
book was the one I had access to. 
10. For example, of torture (McKeown, 2009) or of mercenarism (Panke and 
Petersohn, 2012). 
11. Shannon is, however, more interested in justification as a mental act of self-
affirmation to resolve a value conflict, in which an act is reasoned to lie outside the 
scope of a norm. By contrast, convention reorientation is where an action is placed 
into a different normative framework as a positive redefinition, versus simply placing 
it outside the scope of a given norm (a negative argument). 
12. The CIA’s Vietnam-era Phoenix Program resembled a targeted killing 
program but it operated primarily through local partners — and left no institutional 
memory, as one self-described “old Agency hand” explained to me (John Rizzo, 
interview with author). The CIA similarly experimented with political assassination 
in partnership with Latin American allies, and had engaged in the limited, quasi-
targeting of terrorists a small number of times under the Reagan administration, but 
without institutionalizing this approach (Fuller, 2017). 
13. Tenet’s reluctance is not unique; during the mid-1980s, Reagan’s security 
executive sought to establish CIA-run teams of local commandos to target terrorists 
in Lebanon, but scrapped the plan due to resistance from both the CIA and the State 
  
Department, both citing the illegality of assassination and the likelihood of strong 
public relations blowback should the operation be exposed (Mazzetti, 2013). 
14. Later advances optical technology, and new aircraft such as the MQ-9 Reaper, 
contributed to the further use of unmanned airpower once the targeted killing program 
was underway (Coll, 2014). 
15. Whether this perception was accurate lies outside the remit of this article. 
16. Another memo, dated 2011, outlines a more specific justification for the 
targeted killing of Anwar al-Awlaki, an al-Qa’ida leader and US citizen. Here, the US 
government claims the authority to target him under the AUMF, positioning the 
operation as a military action directed at an imminent threat rather than a punishment 
for terrorist crimes, and acknowledges but dismisses civil liberties concerns 
surrounding extrajudicial execution (see: https://www.washingtonpost.com/r/2010-
2019/WashingtonPost/2014/06/23/National-
Security/Graphics/memodrones.pdf?tid=a_mcntx). 
17. By comparison, this process of legal normalization took place with Israel’s 
targeted killing program far sooner, in part, because the program was led by the 
military and prosecuted in places visible to the public eye (Pratt, 2013). 
18. In this, I deviate from the bulk of existing “practice turn” literature in the field, 
which takes its cues more from Bourdieu (Büger and Gadinger, 2015). 
19. This contrasts with a strict separation of action theory into contrasting logics 
of appropriateness and consequences (March and Olsen, 1998). 
20. Documents on the CIA’s torture of suspected terrorists highlight the 
technological development supposedly offered by a new “science” of interrogation 
(Soufan, 2011), while the deployment of armed contractors became increasingly 
integrated into US force deployments in Iraq as a result of better communications 
technologies (Col. (ret.) Christopher Mayer, interview with author). 
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